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model, namely an unknown wage offer distribution and different reference standards, provide 
theoretical justifications for this conjecture. In both extensions, changing frames of reference 
are identified as a channel through which the phenomenon of increasing reservation wages 
may arise. In as far as language skills or self-evaluated returns to characteristics reflect a 
person’s frames of reference, we find empirical support for this mechanism to be present. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  F22, J15, J61, J64 
  






Klaus F. Zimmermann 
IZA 
P.O. Box 7240 
D-53072 Bonn 
Germany 
E-mail: zimmermann@iza.org   
 
                                                 
* Financial support from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) 
for the project on “Ethnic Diversity and Labor Market Success” in the DFG-Priority Program “Flexibility 
in Heterogeneous Labor Markets” (Flexibilisierungspotenziale bei heterogenen Arbeitsmärkten) is 
gratefully acknowledged. The IAB (Nuremberg) kindly gave us permission to use the administrative 
data employed in this study in the context of the IZA Evaluation Dataset (Caliendo et al., 2010). We 
would like to thank Simone Schüller and Martin Guzi as well as participants at the 7th IZA Annual 
Migration Meeting in Bonn, at the 24th ESPE Conference in Essen and at the 3rd IAB Ph.D. Workshop 
in Nuremberg for helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own. “We don’t wake up for less than $10,000 a day.”
Linda Evangelista, Supermodel, Vogue (1990)
1 Introduction
The literature which aims at explaining the migrant-native differences in economic
outcomes such as labor force participation, labor earnings, and unemployment rates,
is large. Starting with Chiswick’s (1978) assimilation paper, most studies in most
migration countries ﬁnd a persistent wage gap between natives and immigrants.
Namely, compared to natives, migrants exhibit higher unemployment rates, lower
employment rates, and lower earnings. With some exceptions, most of the studies
focus on ﬁrst generation migrants, i.e., migrants who have themselves moved from
one country to another. Second generation migrants, who are the offspring of ﬁrst
generation migrants and are born in the host country, have received less attention.1
However, this group of migrants is of increasing concern, both from an academic and
a policy perspective. In the course of the past century, many countries have accumu-
lated sizeable stocks of migrants and their descendants. Although one would expect
migrant-native differences in economic outcomes to decrease from one generation
to the next, this is generally not the case (see Algan et al., 2010, for evidence on
France, Germany and the UK).
Germany is an interesting example because of its relatively large migration
inﬂows over a long period. These inﬂows became sizeable permanent stocks of
both ﬁrst and second generation migrants that are now present in Germany. In
2007, almost 19 percent of the German population (or 15.4 million persons) had a
migration background. Fewer than half of those are actually foreign citizens. Among
children aged 5 and below, the share is even higher: around one third is descended
from a family with a migration background. Turks are by far the largest group of
individuals with a migration background (about 2.5 million in 2007), followed by
Poles, Russians and Italians (R¨ uhl, 2009).
In addition, native-migrant gaps in economic outcomes are relatively persis-
tent over the two generations of migrants in Germany. Algan et al. (2010) provide
cross-country evidence on the performance of ﬁrst and second generation migrants
in terms of education, earnings and employment. Their results for Germany indi-
cate lower educational outcomes of ﬁrst generation immigrants when compared to
natives, and particularly low achievements for those from traditional guest worker
countries. While educational attainment improves substantially for second genera-
1Exceptions for Germany comparing the economic outcomes of immigrants, immigrants’ children
and natives include Gang and Zimmermann (2000), Riphahn (2003), Constant and Zimmermann
(2003) and Uhlendorff and Zimmermann (2006). Among the ﬁrst studies in the United States is
Chiswick (1977).
1tion immigrants, outcomes are still below those of comparable natives. With respect
to earnings, Algan et al. (2010) conclude that wage assimilation from one genera-
tion to the next is weak, and that there remains a substantial wage differential for
all immigrant groups even for the second generation. Lastly, the authors show that
native-migrant employment gaps in Germany are relatively large, in particular for
Turks and Central and Eastern Europeans, and that, at least for men, these gaps do
not appear to decrease from one generation to the next.
The lack of migrant intergenerational improvement is puzzling and studies
tend to ﬁnd conﬂicting results. A number of potential explanations are discussed
in the literature. First, second generation migrants may be discriminated against in
the labor market. One would expect ethnic discrimination to be primarily a concern
for ﬁrst generation migrants, but evidence from various European countries indi-
cates that also second generation migrants are affected (see, e.g., Jonsson, 2007,
and other studies in the same volume). Moreover, second generation migrants who
do not have the citizenship of the host country may also face institutional discrimi-
nation (Kogan, 2007; Phalet, 2007). Second, the endowment of second generation
migrants in terms of ethnic and human capital may be another explanation for the
lack of intergenerational mobility. The quality of the ethnic environment of ﬁrst gen-
eration migrants, what Borjas (1992) calls ethnic capital, inﬂuences the skills and
labor market outcomes of their offspring. Card et al. (2000) show that for the last
50 years in the United States, the rate of intergenerational assimilation in educa-
tional attainment has remained stable and the rate of intergenerational assimilation
in earnings has remained constant. Kalter and Granato (2007) conclude that missing
relevant human capital is still an important explanation for the lack of intergenera-
tional improvement in Germany.2 Third, there are explanations for the persistence
of native-migrant gaps in economic outcomes across migrant generations, which are
based on ethnic identity. For example, the concept of downward assimilation de-
scribes the assimilation of the second generation with the native underclass, which
might lead to a permanent marginalization. Such developments are documented in
the United States (Portes and Zhou, 1993) and in Europe (Silberman and Fournier,
2007; Heath et al., 2008). Two other processes are discussed in the literature: taste
for isolation and oppositional identities (Blackaby et al., 2005). Both result either
from discrimination or are made by choice, i.e., certain immigrant groups may ac-
tually like to isolate themselves from the receiving society or develop resentments
against the dominant host culture (see Constant and Zimmermann, 2008, for a dis-
cussion in the context of ﬁrst generation migrants).
2Constant and Zimmermann (2003) show that it is the mother’s education and not the father’s
occupation that inﬂuences the occupational choices of the immigrant children. In stark contrast,
Germans are more likely to choose occupations similar to their father’s occupation when the father is
in the white-collar or professional category.
2Whereas these approaches focus on the lack of intergenerational improvement
in terms of economic outcomes, this paper takes a slightly different perspective. It
concentrates on one important underlying mechanism in determining economic out-
comes: the process of job search and the acceptance of a job offer. Since employment
biographies become more unstable and more fragmented, and labor markets in gen-
eral become more ﬂexible (Eichhorst et al., 2010), the importance of job search and
the success of job ﬁnding are critical. But there may be crucial differences in job
search behavior between ﬁrst and second generation migrants. For instance, Heath
and Li (2008) argue that the lack of intergenerational improvement in the United
Kingdom may be explained by differences in the willingness to accept low paid jobs
or to work in the enclave economy. The failure to catch up across generations could
result from lower reservation wages of ﬁrst generation migrants when compared to
their offspring. Changing frames of reference from one migrant generation to the
next are identiﬁed as a potential channel through which this phenomenon may arise.
Whereas the comparative reference group of ﬁrst generation migrants may be their
families, co-ethnics and peers in the country of origin, second generation migrants
may expect to be treated like their peers from the host country. Similarly, Stark
and Taylor (1991) develop the hypothesis that international migrants (i.e., ﬁrst gen-
eration migrants) keep their reference group in their country of origin in order to
improve their relative position within their original reference group.3 This positive
effect of migration might be outweighed by changing the reference group to the one
in the host society. The more different the home and host societies are, the less likely
it is thus for reference group substitution.4
This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that reservation wages of second
generation migrants exceed those of ﬁrst generation migrants. Two extensions of
the basic model of job search provide theoretical justiﬁcations for this hypothesis:
a) an unknown wage offer distribution, and b) reference standards. In both cases,
changing frames of reference are identiﬁed as a channel through which the phe-
nomenon of increasing reservation wages over migrant generations may arise. Our
empirical analysis uses data on entrants into unemployment at a very early stage of
the unemployment spell.5 Our results conﬁrm our hypothesis and show an uncon-
ditional reservation wage gap of 2.3 percent between ﬁrst and second generation
migrants, which increases to about 3.5 percent and becomes statistically signiﬁcant
once differences in characteristics are taken into account. In a next step, we approx-
3This is also one reason that explains why immigrants are willing to work in low rank jobs that no
native would be willing to take.
4The assumption about reference group substitution is part of the “relative deprivation hypothe-
sis.” Accordingly, relatively more deprived households are more likely to send migrants to foreign
labor markets given that there is an expected income gain (Stark and Taylor, 1991).
5Reservation wages of migrants in Germany were also studied in Constant and Zimmermann
(2005). However, this analysis does not distinguish between ﬁrst and second generation migrants.
3imate potentially different reference groups between the two migrant generations
by introducing measures of ethnic self-identiﬁcation, the ethnosizer—an objective
two-dimensional measure of ethnic identity—and German language skills. Whereas
the former two measures do not explain much of the reservation wage gap between
migrant generations, German language skills do explain a substantial part of this
gap. Although host language proﬁciency can be viewed as part of human capital,
it is endogenously determined and depends on the individual’s social network and
his or her social interactions. Language may thus reﬂect, at least in part, frames
of reference. A decomposition analysis moreover suggests that a substantial part of
the unconditional reservation wage gap is driven by higher self-evaluated returns to
characteristics of second generation migrants, e.g., with respect to education. We
argue that self-evaluations may reﬂect frames of reference.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After discussing theoret-
ical considerations in Section 2, we provide an overview of our data in Section 3.
Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical results. A sensitivity analysis is per-
formed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
This section provides theoretical arguments for our hypothesis that reservation wages
increase from ﬁrst to second generation migrants. We start by brieﬂy reviewing the
standard model of job search and extend this framework in two ways: a) we relax
the assumption of a known wage offer distribution, and b) we directly incorporate a
reference standard into the model. Both extensions provide theoretical justiﬁcations
to our conjecture that changing frames of reference are a channel through which the
phenomenon of increasing reservation wages from one migrant generation to the
next may arise.
2.1 The Basic Model of Job Search
The starting point of our analysis is the standard model of job search (McCall, 1970;
Mortensen, 1970).6 In this model the reservation wage represents the crucial wage
above which an individual is willing to accept job offers. It is assumed that unem-
ployed individuals seek to maximize the expected present value of future income
streams over an inﬁnite horizon. In a given period, a job offer with wage w is re-
ceived with probability λ, where w is an exogenously determined random variable
distributed according to the wage offer distribution H(w). More importantly, this
distribution is assumed to be known to the job seeker.
6See also Chapter 3 of Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
4The basic setup furthermore assumes that a) individuals are risk neutral, b) the
discount rate is equal to d, c) jobs are separated exogenously with probability q per
period, d) search is costless, e) non-labor income equals b per period, and f) there is
no on-the-job search. It can then be shown that the (unique) reservation wage ξ is
determined by the following equation:





(w − ξ) dH(w) . (1)
Therefore, the individual’s reservation wage ξ depends on the income stream during
job search b, the job arrival rate λ, the discount rate d, and the job separation rate q.












< 0 . (2)
Hence, according to the basic model the reservation wage ξ depends positively on
the income stream during job search b and the job arrival rate λ, while it decreases
with the discount rate d and the job separation rate q.
There are several extensions to the basic model of job search, addressing and
relaxing assumptions which may be an oversimpliﬁcation. In what follows, we incor-
porate two extensions to the basic model: a) an unknown wage offer distribution,
and b) reference standards.
2.2 Unknown Wage Offer Distribution
The assumption of a known wage offer distribution H(w) is sometimes referred to
as one of the most heroic assumptions of job search models (Franz, 1980). But
relaxing this assumption has important implications: if this distribution is unknown,
the reservation wage becomes a function of the job seeker’s beliefs.
Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) formulate a model which is based on the as-
sumption that workers do not have precise knowledge of the distribution of the pre-
vailing wages.7 Their study is frequently cited for showing that when the distribution
of prevailing wages is unknown, learning takes place during job search, and the in-
dividual reservation wage declines as a consequence of the selection process during
the ongoing unemployment spell. However, the authors also address the situation
at the very beginning of the unemployment spell. At the start of search, job seek-
ers form beliefs about the unknown distribution H(w), summarizing the knowledge
which has been accumulated through various sources of information (e.g., newspa-
7Other studies relaxing the assumption of search models that the wage (or price) offer distribution
is known include Kohn and Shavell (1974), Rothschild (1974), Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996) and
Dubra (2004).
5pers, wage statistics, wages of friends, relatives, or colleagues). In this setup, the
reservation wage is therefore a function of the workers’ beliefs—at the beginning of
the respective unemployment spell based on external information, and subsequently
modiﬁed after wage offers have been received.
How are initial beliefs about the wage offer distribution formed? We argue
that reference groups play a crucial role in this regard, and that these reference
groups shift from one migrant generation to the next (Heath and Li, 2008). More
precisely, our working hypothesis is that ﬁrst generation migrants are still relatively
strongly attached to their country of origin, and therefore sources of information
which they use to form beliefs (i.e., their reference groups) come to a sizeable extent
from abroad. In contrast, the beliefs of second generation migrants should be more
strongly based on German experiences because these migrants are born and raised
in the host country and because individuals compare themselves with similar age
groups. We thus expect reference groups to shift over migrant generations. Given
that wage levels in migrants’ home countries are below those of Germany, we would
expect reservation wages to increase from ﬁrst to second generation migrants.
Subsequently, during the course of the unemployment spell, individuals can
alter and modify their beliefs depending on the wage offers they receive. Social net-
works and personal contacts are a major source of information about job offers, and
a substantial number of jobs are found through these channels (Granovetter, 1995;
Franzen and Hangartner, 2006). Updating initial beliefs may also occur through
the process of peer updating, i.e., via wage offers that members of the individuals’
network have received rather than the individuals themselves (Kriechel and Pfann,
2006). In both cases, if the composition of social networks or peer groups shifts
from one migrant generation to the next accordingly (i.e., from stronger attachment
to the country of origin towards a more German-oriented perspective), reservation
wages of ﬁrst generation migrants are also in the course of the unemployment spell
lower than those of second generation migrants, other things equal.
2.3 Shifting Reference Standards
So far, reference standards are only indirectly included in the model by assuming
that they play a crucial role in forming beliefs about the (unknown) wage offer dis-
tribution. A slightly different, albeit related and more pragmatic extension directly
incorporates a reference standard r into this framework.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that the absolute wage w as well as the relative
wage (w − r) contribute linearly to the utility of an employed individual.8 The
8See, e.g., Falk and Knell (2004) for a more general model of reference standards. They employ a
similar speciﬁcation into a more general framework of utility maximization.





(1 − θ)w + θ(w − r) + (1 − q)Ve(w) + qVu

, (3)
where the discount rate is equal to d, the parameter θ determines the extent to
which comparisons play a role, jobs are separated exogenously with probability q
per period, and Vu is the discounted expected utility of an unemployed individual.
Note that the discounted expected income of an unemployed individual does not
change compared to the standard model of job search.
Utility maximization and rearranging terms yields the following expression for
the reservation wage ξ:9





(w − ξ) dH(w) + θr . (4)
The reservation wage ξ is increasing in the reference standard r as well as in θ, i.e., in
the extent to which comparisons play a role. Changing frames of reference is thus a
channel through which increasing reservation wages from one migrant generation to
the next may arise, if the reference standard r shifts accordingly across generations.
3 Data and Sample Characteristics
We test the hypothesis of increasing reservation wages from one migrant generation
to the next using data from the IZA Evaluation Dataset (Caliendo et al., 2010). We
concentrate on one of the two pillars of the data: a survey of almost 18,000 individ-
uals who entered unemployment between June 2007 and May 2008. An important
advantage of this dataset is that the individuals were interviewed shortly after en-
tering unemployment. Our analysis is based on the ﬁrst wave of the survey, which
takes place about two months after unemployment entry.10 The added value of this
dataset is the large variety of topics that it addresses: questions cover many impor-
tant individual characteristics which are rarely available for economic research but
inﬂuence economic outcomes. Examples include personality traits (Borghans et al.,
2008), attitudes (Bonin et al., 2007), cognitive skills (Heckman et al., 2006), and
ethnic identity (Constant and Zimmermann, 2009).
Most importantly for our study, respondents in this dataset report their reser-
vation wages (details are given below). Moreover, the dataset contains relatively
detailed information about the individuals’ migration background, migrant-speciﬁc
9See Appendix A1 for a more detailed representation, including intermediate steps.
10The survey consists of two additional rounds of interviews. Respondents are interviewed again
one year and three years after unemployment entry, respectively.
7characteristics (e.g., language skills and language use) and ethnic identity. This
information allows us to construct the ethnosizer (Constant, Gataullina, and Zim-
mermann, 2009), a two-dimensional index of ethnic identity. Viewing this measure
as an approximation of frames of references, we can proceed testing our working
hypothesis. We also employ other approximations of frames of references, ethnic
self-identiﬁcation and German language skills, which are both part of the ethnosizer.
The setup of the IZA Evaluation Dataset takes into account the speciﬁc situation
of migrants in Germany in a different way: next to a detailed assessment of the
individuals’ migration background, the interviews were—depending on the language
skills of the interviewees—also available in Turkish and Russian. These are the native
languages of the two major migrant groups in Germany. Altogether, 207 individuals
were interviewed in these languages.
3.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Analysis
For our analysis, we select individuals with a migration background, who are be-
tween 18 and 55 years old when entering unemployment. This “prime age” time
frame helps us avoid difﬁculties with accounting for the decision to (early-)retire.
We exclude individuals with missing information on important characteristics (e.g.,
wage information from previous employment) and focus on individuals who were
unemployed job seekers during the ﬁrst interview. Only these individuals are re-
quested to state their reservation wages. We furthermore drop the top and bottom
percentile of the reported net hourly reservation wages. After applying these crite-
ria, we end up with 1,342 individuals with a migration background. Out of them,
776 individuals are ﬁrst generation migrants and 566 individuals are second genera-
tion migrants. While ﬁrst generation migrants are individuals who are not German-
born, second generation migrants are a) individuals who are German-born, but do
not have German citizenship, and b) individuals who are German-born, but at least
one of their parents is not German-born. We thus apply a very straightforward deﬁ-
nition of second generation migrants, including basically all individuals who have a
migration background but are German-born.11
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of our sample by migration background.
First and second generation migrants have on average roughly the same age and
the gender distribution is fairly similar. The share of migrants with German citi-
zenship is high in both groups. Almost 70 percent of ﬁrst generation migrants are
German citizens. This high percentage can be explained by the substantial inﬂow
of ethnic Germans, who immigrated from the former USSR and Central and Eastern
11We assess the sensitivity of our results to this deﬁnition in Section 5. More speciﬁcally, in the
second generation group, we also include foreign-born individuals who migrated to Germany at a
very young age.
8European countries, in particular around 1990. These individuals were considered
to be of German descent and were usually granted German citizenship upon arrival.
Moreover, the migrants in our sample have been in Germany for a relatively long
time, and thus for many of them it became possible to obtain the German citizen-
ship.12 The share of German citizenship holders among the second generation is
even higher (about 80 percent). The naturalization requirements and procedure in
Germany changed in 2000, when the German citizenship law was reformed. Before
the reform, obtaining German citizenship was primarily through bloodlines (ius san-
guis) and residence of at least 15 years. After the reform the law of soil (ius soli)
became available to immigrant children born in Germany, and years of residence to
apply for naturalization were reduced to eight (with exceptions such as three years
for persons with a German spouse).13 Less than 10 percent of the ﬁrst generation
migrants live in East Germany, whereas 18 percent of second generation migrants
do. The share of married individuals among ﬁrst generation migrants is higher than
among second generation migrants. The share of ﬁrst generation migrants without
a formal educational or vocational degree is higher than that of second generation
migrants. However, more ﬁrst generation migrants have a general qualiﬁcation for
university entrance or a university degree than second generation migrants. First
and second generation migrants in our sample earned similar average wages be-
fore becoming unemployed and the average duration of previous employment was
almost the same in both groups. These statistics also indicate that both groups of
recent entrants into unemployment had a relative strong attachment to the labor
market in the past.
12Years since migration are 18 years on average, see Table 2.
13See Zimmermann, Constant, and Gataullina (2009) for a more detailed description and analysis
of the naturalization process in Germany.
9Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Selected Characteristics by Migrant Generation)
1st generation 2nd generation
Sociodemographic characteristics




German citizenship 0.695 0.807
(0.461) (0.395)





No formal degree 0.023 0.014
(0.151) (0.118)
Secondary school (9 yrs.) 0.341 0.387
(Hauptschule) (0.475) (0.487)
Secondary school (10 yrs.) 0.335 0.387
(Realschule) (0.472) (0.487)
Technical college entrance qualiﬁcation (11-12 yrs.) 0.052 0.051
(Fachabitur, Fachhochschulreife) (0.221) (0.221)
General qualiﬁcation for university entrance (12-13 yrs.) 0.249 0.161
(Abitur, Allgemeine Hochschulreife) (0.433) (0.368)
Vocational attainment
No formal degree 0.224 0.127
(0.417) (0.334)
Apprenticeship (dual system) 0.460 0.594
(0.499) (0.492)
Specialized vocational school 0.142 0.157
(0.349) (0.364)
University, technical college 0.174 0.122
(0.379) (0.327)
Previous employment
Net hourly wage (in euros) 7.239 7.246
(3.218) (3.084)
Duration (in months) 40.406 40.251
(61.124) (61.081)
# Observations 776 566
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. First generation migrants are not German-born; second generation mi-
grants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not German-born.
10Table 2 presents further descriptive statistics for the two groups of migrants
in our data. It focuses on migrant-speciﬁc characteristics to shed more light on
their migration background and migration history. We ﬁrst consider the country of
origin of ﬁrst and second generation migrants. For this purpose, we aggregate the
respondents’ countries of origin into three major sending regions: a) guest worker
countries, b) Central and Eastern European countries, and c) other countries.14 The
descriptive statistics then basically reﬂect two major developments in Germany’s
migration history. First, almost 60 percent of ﬁrst generation migrants are from
Central and Eastern European countries. This substantial share can be explained by
the sizeable inﬂow of ethnic Germans who came to Germany around 1990, with the
fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent East-to-West migration. Second, more
than 40 percent of second generation migrants in our sample have a lineage in guest
worker countries.15 They are the offspring of the guest workers who were hired to
migrate to Germany during the post-war economic boom and kept migrating until
the early 1970s and the halt on labor migration in 1973.
Table 2 shows that, on average, ﬁrst generation migrants have been in Ger-
many for a long time, having moved when they were rather young. The average
years since migration of ﬁrst generation migrants exceeds 18 years, and the aver-
age age at migration is about 17 years. Moreover, about half of the ﬁrst generation
migrants completed an educational degree abroad and about 30 percent have a voca-
tional degree from abroad. These numbers appear plausible as most ﬁrst generation
migrants spent substantial parts of their lives in their country of origin, mostly dur-
ing childhood and adolescence when schooling takes place. The share of second
generation who completed a vocational or educational degree abroad is virtually
zero (1.6 percent).
14Guest worker countries include Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Central
and Eastern European countries include Poland, the former USSR, the former CSSR, and Romania.
15The country of origin of second generation migrants is either a) the country of their citizenship
(if they do not have German citizenship), or b) their parents’ country of origin. If the latter is not the
same for both parents, we take the father’s country of origin (Card et al., 2000; Jonsson, 2007).
11Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Migrants’ Characteristics)
1st generation 2nd generation
Country of origin (by region)
Guest worker countriesa 0.202 0.419
(0.402) (0.494)
Central and Eastern European countriesb 0.579 0.148
(0.494) (0.356)
Other countries 0.219 0.433
(0.414) (0.496)
Time in Germany
Years since migration 18.139 –
(9.756)
Age at migration 16.809 –
(10.883)
Education abroad
Educational degree abroad 0.487 0.016
(0.500) (0.125)
Vocational degree abroad 0.305 0.016
(0.461) (0.125)
# Observations 776 566
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. First generation migrants are not German-born; second generation mi-
grants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not German-born.
a Guest worker countries include Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and Greece.
b Central and Eastern European countries include Poland, the former USSR, the former CSSR and Romania.
3.2 Measures of Frames of Reference
To measure ethnic identity, we apply the two-dimensional version of the ethnosizer in
our empirical analysis (Constant and Zimmermann, 2008; Constant, Gataullina, and
Zimmermann, 2009). We argue that the ethnosizer provides an approximation of the
different reference groups by measuring the intensity of commitment to the home
and the host culture. It is a complex concept, which classiﬁes immigrants into four
distinct states or regimes: a) assimilation, b) integration, c) marginalization, and
d) separation. An assimilated immigrant has a high commitment to the host culture
and a weak one to the home culture. Being integrated means to be committed to
both the home and host cultures. Marginalization displays a weak attachment to
either culture, and separation exhibits a strong commitment to the home culture,
but not to the host one. The four states are formed by combining four essential
elements of personal devotion to the German culture and society and to the culture
and society of origin: a) language, b) ethnic self-identiﬁcation, c) ethnic interaction,
12and d) migration history.16
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of the speciﬁc variables we use in our
model. For this purpose, we have transformed the respondents’ answers vis-` a-vis
the four elements into variables ranging from 0 to 1. Note that for each element
we have information on both countries. For each country, a value of zero indicates
no commitment and a value of one indicates total and absolute commitment. For
example, for the element language, a value close to one corresponds to better Ger-
man language skills and a more frequent use of a different language than German
as family language.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Components of the Ethnosizer)
1st generation 2nd generation
Language
German language skills 0.775 0.903
(0.195) (0.127)
Family language 0.366 0.148
(0.276) (0.218)
Ethnic self-identiﬁcation
Self-identiﬁcation with Germany 0.746 0.718
(0.213) (0.225)
Self-identiﬁcation with country of origin 0.570 0.510
(0.318) (0.328)
Ethnic interaction
Language with friends 0.301 0.116
(0.271) (0.186)
Migration history
Intention to apply for German citizenship 0.804 0.864
(0.346) (0.308)
Center of interest in 5 years (10–15 years) 0.218 0.242
(0.244) (0.250)
# Observations 776 566
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. First generation migrants are not German-born; second generation mi-
grants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not German-born. All variables range between 0
and 1. A higher value corresponds to better German language skills, a more frequent use of a different language than
German as family language, a stronger self-identiﬁcation with Germany, a stronger self-identiﬁcation with the country of
origin, a more frequent use of another language than German with friends, a higher probability of applying for German
citizenship, and a higher probability of leaving Germany.
16Our data do not include the exact same questions as the GSOEP, which has been used so far to
construct the ethnosizer. Therefore, we use a modiﬁed version and rely only on four elements. The
element “culture” is not included in our ethnosizer here.
13Second generation migrants report a better German language proﬁciency than
ﬁrst generation migrants and a less frequent use of a different language than German
as their family language. The degree of self-identiﬁcation with Germany is similar
across the two migrant generations in our sample, albeit slightly weaker in the group
of second generation migrants. Second generation migrants self-identify to a lower
extent with the country of origin, but the difference is rather small. The use of a dif-
ferent language than German as a means of communication among friends is rather
uncommon for second generation migrants, but more frequent among ﬁrst genera-
tion migrants. Finally, second generation migrants report both a higher probability
to apply for German citizenship and a higher probability of leaving Germany in the
future.17
To construct the four identity states of the ethnosizer for each individual, we
proceed as follows. With respect to language usage and ability, we approximate
the commitment to the host country via the command of the German language and
the commitment to the country of origin via the actual communication with family
members. More speciﬁcally, a respondent with a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ command of
the German language who communicates to his or her family members at least half
in another language is classiﬁed as linguistically integrated; a respondent with at
least a ‘good’ command of the German language who communicates to his or her
family members ‘only’ or ‘mostly’ in German is classiﬁed as linguistically assimilated;
a respondent with relatively poor or no command of the German language who
communicates to his or her family members at least half in another language is
classiﬁed as linguistically separated; and ﬁnally, a respondent with relatively poor or
no command of the German language who communicates to family members ‘only’
or ‘mostly’ in German is classiﬁed as linguistically marginalized. Similarly, migrants
who self-identify both strongly with Germany and with the country of origin are
considered as integrated; migrants who self-identify strongly with Germany but to
a smaller extent with the country of origin are considered as assimilated; migrants
who self-identify strongly with the country of origin but to a smaller extent with
Germany are considered as separated; and, ﬁnally, migrants who self-identify only
weakly both with Germany and the country of origin are considered as marginalized.
With respect to the other two dimensions of ethnic interaction and migration history,
individuals are categorized analogously.
Figure 1 juxtaposes the distribution across all four states of the ethnosizer for
ﬁrst and second generation migrants in our sample. The distributions are rather
similar: both have the highest score for assimilation, followed by integration and
marginalization, while separation is ranking last. However, the score for assimilation
is higher in the second generation, whereas the scores for all three other dimensions
17This is in line with the ﬁnding that migrants with German passports exit more frequently (Con-
stant and Zimmermann, 2011).
14Figure 1: Two-Dimensional Ethnosizer by Migration Status
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Mean scores for each of the four states of the ethnosizer. First generation migrants are not German-born; second
generation migrants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not German-born.
are slightly below those of the ﬁrst generation. This seems plausible because second
generation migrants feel more dedicated to the German culture than ﬁrst generation
migrants. Furthermore, this ﬁnding reinforces our hypothesis of changing frames of
references from one migrant generation to the next.
3.3 Reservation Wages and Ethnic Identity
There are still comparatively few empirical studies that directly incorporate reserva-
tion wages in their analysis. The main reason for this lies in the scarcity of adequate
data sets; but our data include self-reported reservation wages, which we can di-
rectly incorporate in our analysis. More speciﬁcally, respondents were posed the
following questions regarding their reservation wage:
a) Now the focus turns to earnings expectations while searching for a job. How
high do you expect your net monthly wage to be? How many hours per week
would you at least have to work in order to receive this net monthly wage?
b) Would you also be prepared to accept a job offer with a lower net monthly
wage? And if so, what is the lowest net monthly wage you would be prepared
to accept? How many hours per week would you at least have to work in order
to receive this net monthly wage?
15Answers to these questions give us information about the individuals’ reservation
wage.18 Moreover, we calculate the reservation wage ratio (RWR). This ratio is
deﬁned as the reservation wage at the time of the interview divided by the previous
wage from (self-)employment, i.e., before entering unemployment.
Table 4 shows the average net hourly reservation wages and reservation wage
ratios. The average reservation wage for the entire sample is A C 7.18, which corre-
sponds to an 11 percent increase compared to the previous wage of individuals in
our sample. The average net hourly reservation wage of second generation migrants
amounts to A C 7.25 and exceeds that of ﬁrst generation migrants. The latter amounts
to A C 7.13. However, the reservation wage ratios are the same in both migrant groups.
Table 4: Reservation Wage (RW) and Reservation Wage Ratio (RWR) by Migration
Status and Ethnic Self-Identiﬁcation
Migrants 1st generation 2nd generation
RW RWR RW RWR RW RWR
Total 7.18 1.11 7.13 1.11 7.25 1.11
Assimilation 7.18 1.10 7.09 1.12 7.32 1.06
Integration 7.33 1.09 7.18 1.07 7.55 1.13
Marginalization 7.00 1.16 7.16 1.17 6.87 1.16
Separation 6.75 1.13 7.04 1.15 6.16 1.07
# Observations 1,342 776 566
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Net hourly reservation wage (RW, in A C). The reservation wage ratio (RWR) is deﬁned as the reservation wage
divided by the previous hourly wage from (self-)employment before entering unemployment. First generation migrants
are not German-born; second generation migrants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not
German-born.
When we further differentiate individuals according to the four regimes of eth-
nic self-identiﬁcation, a few observations can be highlighted. First, integrated indi-
viduals have the highest average reservation wage. This result is mainly driven by
integrated second generation migrants whose average net hourly reservation wage
is particularly high with A C 7.55. Second, ﬁrst generation migrants have rather simi-
lar net hourly reservation wages across the four regimes of ethnic self-identiﬁcation.
Third, marginalized and in particular separated second generation migrants have
18If both questions are answered, one can interpret response a) as the conditional expected wage
and b) as the reservation wage (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983).
16rather low net hourly reservation wages. Fourth, the variation in terms of reser-
vation wage ratios across the four regimes of ethnic self-identiﬁcation is relatively
modest in both migrant groups. The overall picture thus suggests that reservation
wages are related to previous wage levels, and individuals seem to regard these as
a reference for future wages. However, there is a considerable degree of variation
across individuals of different migration status, and also across the four regimes of
ethnic self-identiﬁcation—in particular in terms of net hourly reservation wages.
We furthermore investigate net hourly reservation wages and reservation wages
of male and female ﬁrst and second generation migrants in West and East Germany,
respectively, as well as reservation earnings and reservation earnings ratios across
the four regimes of ethnic self-identiﬁcation.19 Based on our separate analysis of
male and female ﬁrst and second generation migrants in West and East Germany,
two important observations become apparent: a) men generally have higher reser-
vation wages than women, and b) individuals living in West Germany generally have
higher reservation wages than those in East Germany. Hence, men in West Germany
have the highest reservation wages irrespective of their migration status. Obvious
reasons for these ﬁndings are that wage levels in West Germany are on average
higher than in East Germany and the wages of men are higher than the wages of
women. The difference between reservation wages of ﬁrst and second generation
migrants is relatively large in West Germany, whereas the reservation wages of both
groups are relatively similar in East Germany. In terms of reservation earnings, it
seems worth to note that reservation earnings ratios are generally lower than those
based on hourly wages. This ﬁnding suggests that hourly reservation wages which
exceed the previous hourly wages are not necessarily resulting from higher monthly
earnings aspirations. Individuals seem to aspire similar earnings as they previously
had, but they would like to work fewer hours for the same amount of money.
19See Tables A1 and A2 (Appendix A2) for details.
174 Empirical Results
Differences in average reservation wages between ﬁrst and second generation mi-
grants may be driven by differences in characteristics. We therefore proceed by
controlling for observable and quantiﬁable differences. Furthermore, we perform
a decomposition analysis of the reservation wage gap between the two groups. By
doing so, we are able to shed more light on the underlying mechanisms which may
drive our results.
4.1 OLS Regressions
To control for differences in characteristics between ﬁrst and second generation mi-
grants, we run OLS regressions of the individuals’ reservation wage and compare
the results with the unconditional gaps. The regressions include socio-demographic
characteristics, household characteristics, educational and vocational attainment,
unemployment beneﬁts, previous employment and other explanatory variables. Fi-
nally, we include measures of ethnic identity as described above, and also a measure
of language ability.
Table 5 displays the OLS regression results. The ﬁrst column reports the uncon-
ditional reservation wage gap between ﬁrst and second generation migrants in our
sample. This raw difference amounts to 2.3 percent, i.e., the reservation wages of
second generation migrants exceed those of ﬁrst generation migrants by this amount.
Although this difference can be considered as economically signiﬁcant, it is not statis-
tically signiﬁcantly different from zero. However, once we include control variables,
the gap between ﬁrst and second generation migrants increases, see column (2).
Second generation migrants have conditional reservation wages which are 3.5 per-
cent higher than those of the ﬁrst generation. The conditional difference is statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly different from zero. All other control variables in this regression
have the expected signs and most of them are statistically signiﬁcant.
We extend our analysis in Table 6 when we additionally include approxima-
tions of frames of reference in our regression framework. Ethnic self-identiﬁcation,
the ethnosizer and German language skills are separately included, see columns (2)–
(4). The ﬁrst column again displays the results of our baseline regression to ease
comparisons. When we include ethnic self-identiﬁcation in column (2), the condi-
tional reservation wage gap remains virtually the same at 3.4 percent. It thus seems
that ethnic self-identiﬁcation does not have any explanatory power regarding the
reservation wage gap between ﬁrst and second generation migrants. The coefﬁcient
on the separated ethnic self-identiﬁcation variable is negative and relatively large,
though not statistically signiﬁcant. When we include the ethnosizer in column (3),
the conditional reservation wage gap decreases slightly although none of the co-
18efﬁcients on the ethnosizer variables is statistically signiﬁcant. However, when we
include German language skills in column (4), the conditional reservation wage gap
between the two migrant generations decreases to 2.6 percent. The difference more-
over becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. Differences in German language skills, which
combine speaking and writing skills, can therefore explain a substantial part of the
difference in reservation wages between ﬁrst and second generation migrants. The
statistically signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient estimate indicates that better language
skills increase reservation wages.
The results of these regressions thus conﬁrm the ﬁrst part of our working hy-
pothesis: second generation migrants indeed have higher reservation wages than
ﬁrst generation migrants. However, we do not ﬁnd strong support for the second
part of our working hypothesis, namely that changing frames of reference are a
channel through which this phenomenon may arise. Ethnic identity and the ethno-
sizer, which both can be viewed as approximations of frames of reference, do not
explain much of the reservation wage gap between migrant generations. This is con-
sistent with ﬁndings of Constant and Zimmermann (2009). Using the GSOEP, they
ﬁnd that the ethnosizer variables affect the work participation decision, but are not
statistically signiﬁcant for earnings.
On the other hand, German language skills do explain a substantial part of the
reservation wage gap between migrant generations. This is a more standard expla-
nation for this gap as language skills can be viewed as part of a person’s human
capital endowment, and should thus enter wages and productivity directly. But lan-
guage skills are also endogenously determined and depend on the individual’s social
network and his or her social interactions. They may thus reﬂect, at least in part,
a person’s frames of reference. It is nonetheless difﬁcult to disentangle these two
components of language skills—human capital and frames of reference—from each
other, although we control for example for previous earnings in our regressions.
19Table 5: Baseline OLS Regressions Reservation Wage
(1) (2)
1st generation migrants reference reference
(reference) (reference)










Partner working full-time –.065
(0.021)∗∗∗
Partner working part-time 0.025
(0.027)
Children in household 0.033
(0.024)
Number of children in household 0.031
(0.013)∗∗
No formal degree reference
(reference)
Secondary school (9 years) 0.03
(Hauptschule) (0.05)
Secondary school (10 years) 0.051
(Realschule) (0.05)
Technical college entrance qualiﬁcation (11-12 years) 0.048
(Fachabitur, Fachhochschulreife) (0.058)
General qualiﬁcation for university entrance (12-13 years) 0.102
(Abitur, Allgemeine Hochschulreife) (0.054)∗




Specialized vocational school 0.047
(0.025)∗
University, technical college 0.191
(0.033)∗∗∗
Duration previous employment >10 years reference
(reference)
Duration previous employment ≤1 year –.077
(0.028)∗∗∗
Duration previous employment ≤5 years –.043
(0.027)
Duration previous employment ≤10 years –.035
(0.033)
Logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts 0.001
(0.003)
Logarithm of previous earnings 0.203
(0.018)∗∗∗
Country of origin: other countries reference
(reference)
Country of origin: guest worker countries –.008
(0.018)
Country of origin: Central/Eastern European countries –.043
(0.017)∗∗
R2 0.001 0.381
# Observations 1,342 1,342
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: (logarithm of) net hourly reservation wages. Additional control variables are dummies for
German states, month of unemployment entry and time between unemployment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available upon
request. First generation migrants are not German-born; second generation migrants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not
German-born.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
20Table 6: Ethnic Identity OLS Regressions Reservation Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migration Background
1st generation migrants reference reference reference reference
(reference) (reference) (reference) (reference)
2nd generation migrants 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.026




















German Language Skills 0.098
(0.042)∗∗
R2 0.381 0.382 0.382 0.384
# Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: (logarithm of) net hourly reservation wages. Additional control variables are male, age
and age squared, married, partner’s employment status, educational and vocational variables, duration of previous employment, logarithm of unemployment
beneﬁts, children in household, logarithm of previous earnings, dummies for country of origin, German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and
time between unemployment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available upon request. German language skills is measured on an
ordinal scale and a higher value refers to better German speaking and writing skills. First generation migrants are not German-born; second generation migrants
are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not German-born.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
4.2 Decomposition
Our previous results indicate a reservation wage gap between ﬁrst and second gen-
eration migrants. To shed more light on the underlying mechanisms behind this
ﬁnding, we perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of this gap (Blinder, 1973;
Oaxaca, 1973).20 The basic idea is to divide a wage gap between two groups into
an explained part resulting from different characteristics such as age or education
(endowments) and an unexplained part resulting from differences in returns to char-
acteristics (coefﬁcients). We additionally include an interaction which captures the
20See, e.g., Thomsen et al. (2008) for a study using a similar methodology to analyze wage gaps
between migrants and natives in Germany.
21fact that differences in endowments and coefﬁcients may exist simultaneously be-
tween the two groups (Jann, 2008). Since we analyze differences in reservation
wages and not in actual wages, the unexplained part represents differences in self-
evaluations of given characteristics by the individuals rather than different rates of
return in the market.
Table 7 presents the results of the decomposition exercise. The comparison
between ﬁrst and second generation migrants again reveals the unconditional reser-
vation wage gap of 2.3 percent. We ﬁnd a very small, but negative endowment
effect. This is related to differences in the regional distribution of ﬁrst and second
generation migrants across German states. On the other hand we ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient effect. It is even larger than the unconditional reser-
vation wage gap and suggests a higher self-evaluation of second generation migrants
for given characteristics when compared to ﬁrst generation migrants. This is in line
with our working hypothesis. More speciﬁcally, it appears that especially the returns
to education are higher evaluated by the second generation.21 The interaction effect
is small and negative.







# Obs. (group 1) 566
# Obs. (group 2) 776
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Note: Dependent variable: (logarithm of) net hourly reservation wages. Additional control variables are male, age and age
squared, married, partner’s employment status, educational and vocational variables, duration of previous employment,
logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in household, logarithm of previous earnings, dummies for country of
origin, German federal states, month of entry into unemployment, time between unemployment entry and interview
(7-14 weeks) and German language skills. Full estimation results are available upon request. First generation migrants
are not German-born; second generation migrants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not
German-born.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
The decomposition analysis thus reveals that the differences between migrant
generations in their reservation wages are related to their self-evaluations of given
characteristics. This, in turn, may be related to changing frames of reference over
migrant generations. It appears that in comparison to ﬁrst generation migrants, sec-
ond generation migrants have for example higher self-evaluations of the returns to
21More detailed results of the decomposition analysis are available upon request.
22education. We argue that these self-evaluations may reﬂect a person’s frames of ref-
erence. For instance, Reeder et al. (1960) ﬁnd that perceived and actual responses
of others inﬂuence how persons think of themselves, in particular if persons do not
think highly of themselves. Goethals (1986) provides an overview of the social com-
parison theory in which the comparative function of reference group is described
as a reference point in making evaluations of ourselves and others.22 This justiﬁes
our assumption that the differences in the self-evaluated returns to characteristics
between the two migrant generations are related to changing frames of reference.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the robustness of our results, we conduct a threefold sensitivity analysis
varying the deﬁnitions of ﬁrst and second generation migrants, respectively. First,
we split the potentially heterogeneous group of ﬁrst generation into two subgroups;
second, we include individuals who moved at very young ages to Germany in the
group of second generation migrants; and third, we exclude individuals from the
second generation who have only one parent with a migration background.
5.1 Heterogeneity of First Generation
One may argue that there exists some heterogeneity within the group of ﬁrst gen-
eration migrants. For instance, the years since those individuals have migrated and
the age at which migration took place vary considerably. The assumption that ﬁrst
generation migrants have their reference group still in their country of origin may
be questionable for individuals who have lived in Germany for a very long time al-
ready or who have arrived at rather young ages. We therefore perform a sensitivity
analysis in which we split the ﬁrst generation into two groups. The ﬁrst group of
ﬁrst generation migrants consists of individuals who have been in Germany for at
least 15 years and who were 13 years or younger when they arrived (‘established
ﬁrst generation migrants’). Since these individuals have been in Germany already
for a relatively long time and arrived when they were rather young, we expect this
group to be closer to the second generation. Their reference group may have shifted
towards Germany. The second group of ﬁrst generation migrants consists of the re-
maining individuals who either have been in Germany for less than 15 years or were
at least 14 years old when they arrived (‘recent ﬁrst generation migrants’).
Table A3 (Appendix A2) displays the results. Second generation migrants and
established ﬁrst generation migrants indeed appear rather similar in terms of their
reservation wages. The two groups both show similar coefﬁcient estimates when
22Goethals (1986) refers to Kelley (1952) in this context.
23compared to recent ﬁrst generation migrants. This again conﬁrms our hypothesis
that reservation wages increase over the migrant generations, but also increase with
time spent in Germany.
5.2 Deﬁnition of Second Generation: Age at Migration
In the second part of the sensitivity analysis, we vary the deﬁnition of the second
generation. So far, the group of second generation migrants includes a) individu-
als who are German-born but do not have German citizenship, and b) individuals
who are German-born but at least one of their parents is not German-born. We
change this deﬁnition and also include individuals who moved themselves to Ger-
many but at very young ages. More speciﬁcally, we include individuals who were at
most six years old when they arrived.23 This is the mandatory school entrance age
in Germany, and thus those individuals would have gone through the entire school
education in Germany (but not necessarily pre-school education). A recent contribu-
tion to the migration literature by Aslund et al. (2009) emphasizes the importance
of the age at migration for the migrants’ integration process. This change affects
166 individuals compared to our baseline deﬁnition: the group of second generation
migrants increases by this number—at the cost of a corresponding decrease in the
number of ﬁrst generation migrants.
Table A4 (Appendix A2) displays the results of this analysis. The reservation
wage gap between the two migrant generations increases both unconditional and
conditional. However, we still ﬁnd that the gap substantially increases once we
control for differences in characteristics, and that it decreases when we additionally
include German language skills. Therefore, the change in the deﬁnition of second
generation migrants does not affect our main ﬁndings, although the effects increase
in magnitude.
5.3 Deﬁnition of Second Generation: Exclusion of Generation 1.5
We implement an alternative change of our deﬁnition of second generation migrants
in the third part of our sensitivity analysis. Our baseline deﬁnition of second gen-
eration migrants considers individuals who are German-born and have at least one
foreign-born parent. In this section we restrict the second generation to individuals
who have both parents with a migration background. We thus exclude the so-called
1.5 generation and argue that their family background may entail a rather strong
attachment to the German culture as they have one German-born parent. We there-
fore expect the remaining second generation migrants to be more similar to the ﬁrst
23Gang and Zimmermann (2000) also use this deﬁnition.
24generation—also in terms of their reservation wages. This narrower deﬁnition of the
second generation reduces our sample to 1,004 migrants, among those are 228 sec-
ond generation migrants.
Table A5 (Appendix A2) displays the results. The magnitude of the reserva-
tion wage gap between the two generations remains virtually the same compared
to the baseline results, both conditional and unconditional. The gap also decreases
similarly as before once we additionally include German language skills. However,
the precision of our estimates generally decreases and it is therefore not possible
to judge whether the results conﬁrm our expectation of a reduced reservation wage
gap for this narrower deﬁnition of second generation migrants. These ﬁnding are in
line with the hypothesis that multiethnic marriages are an indicator of integration
and, therefore, of changing frames of reference.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides strong empirical evidence on the reservation wages of ﬁrst and
second generation migrants in Germany. Two extensions of the basic of job search
model provide theoretical justiﬁcations for the hypothesis of increasing reservation
wages from one migrant generation to the next. These extensions are: a) an un-
known wage offer distribution, and b) reference standards. In both cases, changing
frames of reference are identiﬁed as a channel through which the phenomenon of
increasing reservation wages may arise. For instance, reservation wages become a
function of the job seekers’ beliefs if the assumption of a known wage offer distri-
bution is relaxed in the basic job search model. We furthermore argue that such
beliefs are formed via reference groups, and that these reference groups shift over
migrant generations. While ﬁrst generation migrants may still be relatively strongly
attached to their country of origin, beliefs of second generation migrants should be
more strongly based on German experiences.
Our empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm the hypothesis of increasing reservation wages
from one migrant generation to the next. In fact, we ﬁnd an unconditional reserva-
tion wage gap of 2.3 percent between ﬁrst and second generation migrants, meaning
that the reservation wages of second generation migrants indeed exceed those of the
ﬁrst generation. This gap increases to about 3.5 percent and becomes statistically
signiﬁcant once differences in characteristics are taken into account. In as far as
German language skills or self-evaluated returns to characteristics reﬂect a person’s
frames of reference, we moreover ﬁnd empirical support that changing frames of
reference explain at least part of this gap. First, if we additionally control for ref-
erence groups via German language skills, the reservation wage gap decreases to
2.6 percent and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. Although language skills may be
25viewed as part of a person’s human capital, these skills are endogenously determined
and depend on the individual’s social network and his or her social interactions—
and they thus reﬂect, at least in part, frames of reference. Second, a decomposition
of the reservation wage gap reveals that the coefﬁcient effect drives the uncondi-
tional reservation wage gap between the two migrant generations. This suggests
that second generation migrants evaluate the returns to their characteristics, such
as the expected returns to their education, higher than ﬁrst generation migrants
do. It is plausible that changing frames of reference are related to these different
self-evaluations between the two migrant generations.
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28Appendix
A1 Job Search and Reference Standards
We incorporate reference standards into the basic model of job search by assuming
that the absolute wage wi as well as the reference standard (wi − ri) contribute in
a linear way to the utility of an employed individual i (Falk and Knell, 2004). The





(1 − θ)wi + θ(wi − ri) + (1 − q)Ve(wi) + qVu

, (A1)
where the discount rate is equal to d, the parameter θ determines the extent to which
comparisons play a role, jobs are separated exogenously with probability q per pe-
riod, and Vu is the discounted expected utility of an unemployed person. Rearranging
the terms of equation (A1), we arrive at:





If an unemployed individual receives a job offer, he or she accepts the offer if
Ve(wi) > Vu, and thus if:
Ve(wi) − Vu =





> 0 . (A3)
The reservation wage, i.e., the crucial wage above which an individual i is willing
to accept job offers, is deﬁned as a threshold value ξi. Accepting a job offer with
wage ξi yields the same utility that the unemployed individual gets by remaining
unemployed:
(1 − θ)ξi + θ(ξi − ri) = dVu . (A4)
Note that the reference standard enters this expression. Alternatively, we can express
the reservation wage as:
ξi = dVu + θri . (A5)
The discounted expected income of an unemployed individual does not change com-
pared to the basic model of job search (cf. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004):







where z are the net beneﬁts when unemployed (i.e., the difference between unem-
ployment beneﬁts b and search costs c), H(w) is the wage offer distribution and λ the
job offer arrival rate.
Hence, inserting equations (A3) and (A5) into the latter expression yields:





(wi − ξi) dH(wi) + θri . (A7)
29A2 Additional Tables
Table A1: Reservation Wage (RW) and Reservation Wage Ratio (RWR) by Migration
Status, Ethnic Self-Identiﬁcation, Region and Gender
Migrants 1st generation 2nd generation
RW RWR RW RWR RW RWR
Men West 7.76 1.13 7.68 1.15 7.89 1.10
Women West 6.77 1.08 6.66 1.06 6.93 1.10
Men East 6.78 1.09 6.73 1.11 6.82 1.08
Women East 6.47 1.16 6.45 1.11 6.47 1.19
# Observations 1,342 776 566
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Net hourly reservation wage (RW, in A C). The reservation wage ratio (RWR) is deﬁned as the reservation wage
divided by the previous hourly wage from (self-)employment before entering unemployment. First generation migrants
are not German-born; second generation migrants are German-born, but not German citizens or at least one parent is not
German-born.
Table A2: Reservation Earnings (RE) and Reservation Earnings Ratio (RER) by Mi-
gration Status and Ethnic Self-Identiﬁcation
Migrants
Migrants Migrants
(1st gen.) (2nd gen.)
RE RER RE RER RE RER
Total 1123.48 1.08 1120.86 1.08 1127.08 1.08
Assimilation 1108.10 1.06 1084.85 1.08 1142.02 1.04
Integration 1151.10 1.07 1137.77 1.04 1170.40 1.13
Marginalization 1098.61 1.10 1146.87 1.11 1060.10 1.10
Separation 1098.46 1.18 1161.89 1.25 968.06 1.03
# Observations 1,342 776 566
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Net monthly reservation earnings (RE, in A C). The reservation earnings ratio (RER) is deﬁned as net monthly
reservation earnings divided by the net monthly earnings from previous (self-)employment, i.e., before entering unem-
ployment. First generation migrants are not German-born; second generation migrants are German-born, but not German
citizens or at least one parent is not German-born.
30Table A3: Sensitivity Analysis I: Heterogeneity of First Generation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migration Background
Recent 1st generation migrantsa reference reference reference reference reference
(reference) (reference) (reference) (reference) (reference)
2nd generation migrants 0.037 0.063 0.062 0.064 0.055
(0.018)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗
Established 1st generation migrantsb 0.040 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.053




















German Language Skills 0.051
(0.046)
Additional Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.004 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.387
# Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: (logarithm of) net hourly reservation wages. Addi-
tional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, partner’s employment status, educational and vocational
variables, duration of previous employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in household, logarithm of
previous earnings, dummies for country of origin, German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time
between unemployment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available upon request.
a First generation migrants who have been in Germany for less than 15 years and arrived in Germany at age 14 or older.
b First generation migrants who have been in Germany for at least 15 years or arrived in Germany at age 13 or younger.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
31Table A4: Sensitivity Analysis II: Age at Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migration Background
1st generation migrants reference reference reference reference reference
(reference) (reference) (reference) (reference) (reference)
2nd generation migrantsa 0.034 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.053




















German Language Skills 0.063
(0.043)
Additional Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.388
# Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: (logarithm of) net hourly reservation wages. Addi-
tional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, partner’s employment status, educational and vocational
variables, duration of previous employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in household, logarithm of
previous earnings, dummies for country of origin, German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time
between unemployment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available upon request.
a Second generation migrants include individuals who arrived in Germany at age six or younger.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
32Table A5: Sensitivity Analysis III: Generation 1.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migration Background
1st generation migrants reference reference reference reference reference
(reference) (reference) (reference) (reference) (reference)
2nd generation migrantsa 0.03 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.027




















German Language Skills 0.133
(0.045)∗∗∗
Additional Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.002 0.397 0.397 0.399 0.402
# Observations 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, wave 1, own calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: (logarithm of) net hourly reservation wages. Addi-
tional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, partner’s employment status, educational and vocational
variables, duration of previous employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in household, logarithm of
previous earnings, dummies for country of origin, German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time
between unemployment entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available upon request.
a Second generation migrants exclude individuals who have only one parent with a migration background (“genera-
tion 1.5”).
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
33